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WHY CONSERVATIVES SHOULDN'T BE
ORIGINALISTS
DAVID A. STRAUSS*

The revival of originalism in the last generation has been, for
the most part, the work of conservatives. That makes it easy to
think that originalism and legal conservatism are natural allies.
But in fact the alliance is an alliance of convenience, and, before
too much longer, it is going to outlive its usefulness. Or at least
so I will argue in this Essay. The cause of legal conservatives
would be much better served if conservatives would abandon
their allegiance to originalism and instead adopt an approach
to constitutional interpretation that is based in precedent-an
approach that seems to me vastly more sound in any event.
Any theory of interpretation, including originalism, can produce sharply different results, depending on who is using the
theory. Of course any theory might be used in bad faith, but that
is not what I mean. The point is that even good-faith interpreters
can reach different results with the same theory. That is why one
quick way to test the soundness of a theory of interpretation is to
ask the question: What theory would you want your opponents
to use, if you could assign a theory to them? If your political opponents were, say, appointing Justices to the Supreme Court,
would you want those appointees to believe in originalism, or in
some other view, such as one based on precedent? It seems to
me that once you ask that question, you are going to conclude
that a precedent-based approach is superior to originalism, even
if you have conservative inclinations.1 The reason is twofold:
originalism makes it too easy for people to find, in the law, the
* Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School. This Essay is a revised version of remarks delivered at The Federalist
Society's 2005 National Lawyers Division Convention.
1. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism,Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277-82 (2005) (discussing reasons why
"a strong theory of precedent" leads to judicial restraint).
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answers they are looking for; and originalism causes people to
hide the ball, to avoid admitting, perhaps even to themselves,
what is really affecting their decisions.
There are at least three reasons why originalism, contrary to
appearances, in fact imposes only a very uncertain limit on
judges and leaves them a great deal of latitude to find, in the
original understandings, the outcomes they want to findsomething that, as I said, may be fine if you want those same
outcomes, but is not fine if your opponents are running the
show. The first is what might be called the problem of ascertainability. At least when you are dealing with old constitutional provisions, which nearly all the controversial provisions
of our Constitution are, it will be very hard to do the historical
work needed to determine what the original understandings
were. Partly this is just a technical problem of becoming conversant with all the relevant materials. But the greater problem
is knowing what inferences to draw from those historical materials. Especially in dealing with highly controversial issues, ascertaining the original understandings will routinely require a
thorough immersion not just in the context of the specific debate but in the culture of the time. It is a lot to expect a busy
judge to do that competently, and it will be all too easy to seize
on any evidence that supports the view of the Constitution that
the interpreter himself prefers.
Let me give an example of just how intractable this basic
problem of ascertainability is. In a terrifically interesting law
review article, Judge Mvichael McConnell has argued that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that was entrenched for a
generation, Brown v. Board of Education2 was consistent with
original understandings. 3 I'm not sure Judge McConnell is correct, but let's assume he is. Now consider the following: In 1953,
the Supreme Court asked the lawyers in Brown to brief the question of what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood it to say about school segregation. 4 The best lawyers and
historians in the country were engaged in the project of trying
to find an originalist justification for the outcome they desired,
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See Michael W. McConneU, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1995).

4. Miscellaneous Orders, 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953).
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which was the unconstitutionality of segregation. They spectacularly failed. The opinion in Brown begins with what can
only be read as a concession that the original understandings do
not support the conclusion the Court reached, that the Four5
teenth Amendment forbids racial segregation.
If Judge McConnell is right, and the original understanding
actually does condemn school segregation, that means that the
best lawyers and historians in the country, as well as the Supreme Court Justices and their clerks, with all the resources
available to them and with every incentive to discover the
original understanding, did not succeed in recovering that
original understanding. This really should give originalists
pause. Everyone is familiar with the argument that originalism
is unacceptable because it would lead to a different result in
Brown. But if Judge McConnell is right, and originalism actually supports the holding in Brown, that may be an even bigger
problem for originalists. It means that, even in close to ideal
circumstances-when all the resources and incentives were in
place to figure out the original understandings -everyone still
6
got the original understandings wrong.
Even if you can solve the problem of ascertainability, there is a
second problem, the problem of indeterminacy, that may be just
as severe. The original understandings might-quite clearlynot resolve the issue at hand. This problem is familiar in the ordinary legislative process. The people involved in drafting and
adopting a provision might not have foreseen a particular issue
that later arises under that provision. Or they might agree on a
form of words but disagree on what the form of words is going
to mean; indeed the words might have been chosen precisely
because they can accommodate diverging understandings.
Here, again, there is a real risk that an interpreter, although acting in good faith, will see what he or she wants to see in the
original understandings.
The third problem, related to the problem of indeterminacy,
might be called the problem of translation. Suppose you've
successfully figured out what the original understandings
were. And suppose that, providentially, those understandings
5. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90.
6. See David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent,and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT.

299, 304-06 (2005).
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would have given a definitive answer to the question you're
interested in, had that question arisen when the constitutional
provision was adopted. Even then, if the provision is an old
one, it is routinely not going to be clear what those understandings say about that issue today. Unless the original understanding was "here is how we are going to answer this question now
and forever," it will be difficult to respond to the argument that
the original understanding dealt with the problems people
were confronting at the time, in the society in which they lived,
with the technology they had, and with the population they
had. The question remains: what was their understanding
about how those problems should be confronted in a wholly
different world, like the one in which we live today?
It is theoretically possible that the original understanding
will be that a particular constitutional provision settled a specific issue for all time. For example, the original understanding
of a provision could be that the federal government should
never regulate some particular kind of activity, no matter what.
But as a practical matter, it is very unlikely that the original
understanding of a constitutional principle would have that
character, or that a judge could, with confidence, determine
that it did. The original understanding is much more likely to be
focused on contemporary times, rather than on other circumstances that might have been literally unimaginable to the people who adopted the provision. The difficult follow-up question
then becomes: how do we translate that original understanding
for our time? And that question virtually invites the presentday decisionmaker to impose his or her own solution, in the
guise of channeling the original understandings.
At the root of these difficulties with originalism is the lack of
any generally accepted justification for following the original
understandings across the board. There is no real answer to
Thomas Jefferson's famous question of why we should allow
the dead to rule the living. 7 In fact, although some originalists
do try to grapple with that question, most don't. The appeal of
originalism to most originalists, I believe, is not some sense of
fealty to past generations. Rather, originalism is appealing be-

7. For a discussion, see David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
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cause there does not seem to be a plausible competitor. 8 The
idea is that if judges don't follow the original understandings,
they will be free to do whatever they want.
But if that is the concern-unfettered judicial discretion-a
precedent-based theory is far better than originalism. Professors Calabresi and Amar have argued very powerfully that
precedent is manipulable, and of course they are right. Judges
pick and choose among precedents, often overrule precedents,
and follow precedent uncertainly. 9 But it seems to me that
originalism is much more manipulable. As a practical matter,
precedent closes off many options. This is an everyday and, I
think, incontrovertible fact for lower court judges, and Supreme Court Justices differ only in kind, not in degree. The
options open to them are sharply limited by, and substantially
structured by, precedent.
Some opponents of a precedent-based approach to constitutional interpretation say that there is really no theory of precedent. But that is not correct, either. I don't think the plurality
opinion in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 10 gives a particularly good account of the theory, but the theory has, in fact, been around for centuries. It was developed,
over time, by common law lawyers, and it finds its most famous
expression in Burke's great work." The theory is one of humility;
of respecting the limits of human reason; and of making judgments about morality, fairness, and justice, but making them
only within the narrow confines left open by tradition. It is not
an algorithm; it does not dictate results. It does not preclude
judges from making judgments about what is right and wrong,
and from allowing those judgments to influence their view of
what the law is, but it limits the scope within which those judgments can influence legal conclusions.
The evil of school segregation ought to have been part of the
reason for the outcome of Brown v. Board of Education, emphasis
equally on the words "ought" and "part." If you think abortion
8. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
9. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of
the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635 (2006).
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1793).
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is evil, that ought to be part of the reason for calling for the
overruling of Roe v. Wade;12 again, emphasis on the word "part."
A common law approach insists that judges are sharply limited
by precedent, but it does not suggest that precedent always determines the outcome of a case-obviously not-and, more important, a common law approach to constitutional interpretation
allows judges and other interpreters to say that part of the reason for a result is that that result is more fair or is better policy.
Sometimes precedent fairly read will foreclose every result but
one. But sometimes it will only narrow the range of acceptable
results. In such instances, if one outcome-authorized although
not dictated by precedent-seems to be much more sensible or
more just, the judge may openly rule that way. 3
The great virtue of the common law approach is that while it
does substantially limit the acceptable results in a case, it alsowithin those limits-allows for a kind of candor that originalism
tends to suppress. The temptation, for an originalist, is to "discover" that the original understanding about some controversial
issue is, conveniently, identical to one's own views. They were
so wise back then! The originalist can then present the outcome of
a case as simply a matter of following the will of the Framers and
avoid admitting, perhaps even to himself, that he is reaching a
result in part because he thinks it is right as a matter of policy.
A common law approach, by contrast, acknowledges that
precedent sometimes takes a judge only so far and leaves the
judge with a degree of flexibility; the rest is a judgment based on
other normative grounds. A common law approach does not
suppress the basis of disagreements by insisting that constitutional law is only about what the original understanding was
and that the decisionmaker's own views play no role at all. In a
word, then, both originalism and a precedent-based, common
law approach leave a range of issues unresolved. My own view
is that originalism, for the reasons I listed earlier, leaves a much
wider range of issues unresolved. But whether or not that is so,
the common law approach has the virtue of acknowledging its
own indeterminacy and encouraging candor to a greater degree
than originalism does.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. See David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L.

REV. 877, 900-03 (1996).
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But why should conservatives, in particular, shun originalism? The reason is that originalism's characteristic featuresersatz determinacy, coupled with an appeal to foundational
sources, all concealing an unexpressed normative agendamakes it a decidedly non-conservative rhetorical weapon.
Originalism, precisely because of these features, provides a set
of arguments that can be used by people who are unhappy
with the status quo. If a judge thinks that what has been built up
over time is corrupt and wants to sweep it away, one excellent
rhetorical strategy is to claim to go back to first principles and
get rid of everything that has happened since.
This is apparent in the career of the Supreme Court Justice
who was by far the most successful originalist of the last century-and who was not a conservative at all. Justice Hugo
Black used originalism in just the way I describe, to attack what
was, in his view, a corrupt tradition. For Justice Black, it was
the tradition of the pre-New Deal Court. Justice Black attributed to the Framers of the Constitution the New Deal consensus on judicial review of economic legislation and what came
to be regarded as the Warren Court views on civil rights and
civil liberties. Present-day conservative originalists are attack14
ing what they see as a different, corrupt judicial tradition.
They, too, turn to originalism. The original understandings are
available as a weapon to those who want to attack a corrupt
tradition, but they are available to almost anyone, just because
originalism is so flexible and open-ended, and because it conceals what is really going on.
Increasingly, though, our constitutional order is becoming
something that conservatives like. The tradition is a conservative one. When the next generation of liberals wants to attack
what the current generation of conservatives has accomplished,
those liberals, some of them anyway, will, I'm betting, invoke
the original understandings. They will, in good faith and with
some degree of accuracy, find material in the original understandings that will support their cause-precisely because
originalism is such an indeterminate, open-ended approach.

14. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741-42

(2007) (describing the efforts of "movement-Republicans" to change the status quo
by promoting originalist judges).
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Conservatives could do themselves a tactical, rhetorical favorand, more important, refocus the constitutional debate on the
real bases of disagreement-if they stopped embracing originalism now. The debate should not be over who has best captured
the original understandings. That debate just invites manipulation and intellectual disingenuousness, and-Jefferson's pointit is not clear why it's relevant anyway. The debate should instead be conducted in fully candid terms, in which judges and
others acknowledge that the law is determined in part but not
entirely by precedent; and in which people avow and defend the
normative commitments that are influencing their decisions, instead of attributing their views to the founding generations.

